As no one can be a father without having a son, nor a master without possessing a servant, so even God cannot be called omnipotent(67) unless there exists those over whom He may exercise His power; and therefore, that God may be shown to be almighty it is necessary that all things should exist. For if any one assumes that some ages or portions of time, or whatever else he likes to call them, have passed away, while those things which have been made did not yet exist, he would undoubtedly show that during those ages or periods God was not omnipotent but became omnipotent afterward: viz., from the time that He began to have those over whom He exercised power; and in this way He will appear to have received a certain increase, and to have risen from a lower to a higher condition; since there can be no doubt that it is better for Him to be omnipotent than not to be so. And, now, how can it appear otherwise than absurd, that when God possessed none of those things which it was befitting for Him to possess, He should afterward, by a kind of progress, come to have them? But if there never was a time when He was not omnipotent,(68) of necessity those things by which He receives that title must also exist; and He must always have had those over whom He exercised power, and which were governed by Him either as king or prince, of which we shall speak more fully when we come to discuss the subject of creatures. (_f_) Origen, _De Principiis_, II, 9:6. (MSG, 11:230.) The theory of pre-existence and the pretemporal fall of each soul was the basis of Origen’s theodicy. It caused great offence in after years when theology became more stereotyped, and it has retained no place in the Church’s thought, for the idea ran too clearly counter to the biblical account of the Fall of Adam.