attack seemed to have every chance in its favour; their guns were in safe positions 2,400 yards from the camp, and along the river banks they could creep close up to the defenders. Hore's old seven-pounder, though it succeeded in silencing a Boer gun, and killed a German gunner, was very capricious in its working, and was obviously no match for the Boer guns. The thousands of horses and oxen which were in the camp under no sort of cover were nearly all killed on the first day by the Boer shells; and the stench arising from these dead animals in the narrow camp makes it almost marvellous that the men who escaped the Boer shells were not killed by pestilence. Moreover, the only chance of getting water was to take the water carts down to the river at night, and then the drivers and escort were not always safe. To make matters worse, on the second day of the siege Carrington's advance scouts, after appearing on the rise to the west, were soon seen retiring again, so that rescue from this side seemed now out of the question. When starting, Carrington did not know that Hore was invested, so he carried very few rations. He no doubt had a small force with him and was badly off for supplies; but he had gained a ridge from which he commanded the way to Elands River, and under the circumstances of Hore's pressing danger he was too quickly discouraged from a more determined effort to bring out the garrison. From the east another attempt was made to relieve Hore which proved equally abortive. On August 5 firing had been heard in the direction of Elands River, so next day Baden-Powell marched with his own and Mahon's mounted troops about half-way to Brakfontein. Here he heard guns firing in a westerly direction, but as the sound seemed to grow fainter and fainter, he assumed, without, however, waiting for the reports of his scouts, that Carrington had succeeded in withdrawing Hore towards Mafeking.