ideal for other lines of endeavor. [Sidenote: And Locke’s ‘discipline’ is of this kind.] [Sidenote: Generalized values of mathematics.] [Sidenote: Locke did not defend the formalism of public schools.] =Locke’s Real Position on Formal Discipline.=--It would seem as if this modified form of general power were all that Locke had in mind. He definitely concedes that “learning pages of Latin by heart, no more fits the memory for retention of anything else, than the graving of one sentence in lead makes it the more capable of retaining firmly any other characters.” And while he holds that the method of reasoning in mathematics can be transferred ‘to other parts of knowledge,’ he declares that men who are reasonable in some things are often very unreasonable in others, and “men who may reason well in one sort of matters to-day may not do so at all a year hence.” The generalized benefits that students may obtain from mathematics are simply that it “would show them the necessity there is, in reasoning, to separate all distinct ideas, and see the habitudes that all those concerned in the present inquiry have to one another, and to lay by those which relate not to the proposition in hand and wholly to leave them out of the reckoning. This is that which in other subjects is absolutely requisite to just reasoning.” Thus Locke appears to be rather in harmony with modern educational theory than a thorough-going advocate of formal discipline. At any rate, it should be recognized that he did not defend, but vigorously assailed, the grammatical and linguistic grind in the English public schools. His attitude toward formal discipline seems to have sprung from his desire to root out the traditional and false, rather than to support the narrow humanistic curricula of the times. SUPPLEMENTARY READING