A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. IIMill, John Stuart
Philosophy
A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, 7th Edition, Vol. II
Mill, John Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Science -- Methodology
It needs scarcely be observed, that general propositions of which no one
can tell exactly what they assert, cannot possibly have been brought to
the test of a correct induction. Whether a name is to be used as an
instrument of thinking, or as a means of communicating the result of
thought, it is imperative to determine exactly the attribute or
attributes which it is to express: to give it, in short, a fixed and
ascertained connotation.
§ 3. It would, however, be a complete misunderstanding of the proper
office of a logician in dealing with terms already in use, if we were to
think that because a name has not at present an ascertained connotation,
it is competent to any one to give it such a connotation at his own
choice. The meaning of a term actually in use is not an arbitrary
quantity to be fixed, but an unknown quantity to be sought.
In the first place, it is obviously desirable to avail ourselves, as far
as possible, of the associations already connected with the name; not
enjoining the employment of it in a manner which conflicts with all
previous habits, and especially not so as to require the rupture of
those strongest of all associations between names, which are created by
familiarity with propositions in which they are predicated of one
another. A philosopher would have little chance of having his example
followed, if he were to give such a meaning to his terms as should
require us to call the North American Indians a civilized people, or the
higher classes in France or England savages; or to say that civilized
people live by hunting, and savages by agriculture. Were there no other
reason, the extreme difficulty of effecting so complete a revolution in
speech would be more than a sufficient one. The endeavour should be,
that all generally received propositions into which the term enters,
should be at least as true after its meaning is fixed, as they were
before; and that the concrete name, therefore, should not receive such a
connotation as shall prevent it from denoting things which, in common
language, it is currently affirmed of. The fixed and precise connotation
which it receives, should not be in deviation from, but in agreement (as
far as it goes) with, the vague and fluctuating connotation which the
term already had.
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