A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)Mill, John Stuart
Philosophy
A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Vol. 1 of 2)
Mill, John Stuart
Knowledge, Theory of; Logic; Science -- Methodology
§ 2. From this, however, the question naturally arises, in what manner are
we to define a name which connotes only a single attribute? for instance,
“white,” which connotes nothing but whiteness; “rational,” which connotes
nothing but the possession of reason. It might seem that the meaning of
such names could only be declared in two ways; by a synonymous term, if
any such can be found; or in the direct way already alluded to: “White is
a name connoting the attribute whiteness.” Let us see, however, whether
the analysis of the meaning of the name, that is, the breaking down of
that meaning into several parts, admits of being carried farther. Without
at present deciding this question as to the word _white_, it is obvious
that in the case of _rational_ some further explanation may be given of
its meaning than is contained in the proposition, “Rational is that which
possesses the attribute of reason;” since the attribute reason itself
admits of being defined. And here we must turn our attention to the
definitions of attributes, or rather of the names of attributes, that is,
of abstract names.
In regard to such names of attributes as are connotative, and express
attributes of those attributes, there is no difficulty: like other
connotative names, they are defined by declaring their connotation. Thus,
the word _fault_ may be defined, “a quality productive of evil or
inconvenience.” Sometimes, again, the attribute to be defined is not one
attribute, but an union of several: we have only, therefore, to put
together the names of all the attributes taken separately, and we obtain
the definition of the name which belongs to them all taken together; a
definition which will correspond exactly to that of the corresponding
concrete name. For, as we define a concrete name by enumerating the
attributes which it connotes, and as the attributes connoted by a concrete
name form the entire signification of the corresponding abstract one, the
same enumeration will serve for the definition of both. Thus, if the
definition of _a human being_ be this, “a being, corporeal, animated,
rational, and shaped so and so,” the definition of _humanity_ will be,
corporeity and animal life, combined with rationality, and with such and
such a shape.
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