A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine GloryBledsoe, Albert Taylor
Religion
A Theodicy, or, Vindication of the Divine Glory
Bledsoe, Albert Taylor
Theodicy
In rejecting the principle for which we contend, Howe has paid the usual
penalty of denying the truth; that is, he has contradicted himself. “It
were very unreasonable to imagine,” says he, “that God cannot, in any
case, extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of
such a creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, (though we
particularly know not, and we are not concerned to know, or curiously to
inquire in what way,) and highly reasonable to suppose that in many cases
he doth.” Here he affirms, that our wills may be overruled and determined
in perfect _conformity to our natures_, in some way or other, though we
know not how. Why, then, does not God so overrule our wills in all cases,
and secure the existence of universal holiness? Because, says he, “it is
manifest to any sober reason, that it were very incongruous this should be
the ordinary course of his conduct to mankind, or the same persons at all
times; that is, that the whole order of intelligent creatures should be
moved only by inward impulses; _that God’s precepts, promises, and
comminations, whereof their nature is capable, should be all made
impertinences_, through his constant overpowering those that should
neglect them; that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral
government, should be rendered to this purpose, _useless and vain_; and
that they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed _as mere
machines that know not their own use_.”
What strange confusion and self-contradiction! The wills of men may be,
and often are, swayed by the mighty, irresistible hand of God, and in a
way _agreeable to their nature_; and yet this is not done in all cases,
lest men should be governed as _mere machines_! The laws, promises, and
threatenings of God, are not to be rendered vain and useless in all cases,
but only in some cases! Indeed, if we would escape such inconsistencies
and self-contradictions, we must return to the position that a necessary
holiness is a contradiction in terms,—that no power can cause it. From
this position we may clearly see, that the laws, promises, and
comminations; the counsels, exhortations, and influences of God, which are
employed to prevent sin, are not a system of grand impertinences,—are not
a vast and complicated machinery to accomplish what might be more
perfectly, easily, and directly accomplished without them. We may see,
that God really desires the holiness and happiness of all men, although
some may be finally lost; that he is in earnest in the great work of
salvation; and when he so solemnly declares that he has no pleasure in the
death of the sinner, but would rather he should turn and live, he means
precisely what he says, without the least equivocation or mental
reservation. This position it is, then, which shows the goodness of God in
unclouded glory, and reconciles his sincerity with the final result of his
labours.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account