The Persians, encumbered and confined, and scarce able to use their arms, were instantly thrown into confusion, and hewn down in immense numbers. The main body faced about, and advanced to the assistance of the rear. The van, confident of victory from their numbers, descended from the heights to pursue their success. The whole crowded together in the narrow passes, making a general, confused attempt to break into the plain: but the Athenians constantly out-fronting them, and the immense numbers of the enemy only serving to incommode themselves, and to create confusion, they were slain as fast as they advanced. At length those in front, unable to withstand the terrible carnage that raged around them, attempted to fly; but being prevented from retreating by those behind them, who not having seen the slaughter, still pushed forward, they precipitately threw themselves into the morass. Victory now declared for the Athenians, who, pursuing their advantage, fell with such violence on the disordered ranks of the enemy, that to escape their fury, their nearest opponents were compelled to turn, and in despair, forced their way through their own friends. A general rout immediately ensued, and the exertions of the Athenians encreasing with their success, they drove the enemy headlong before them. Near thirty thousand Persians fell by the sword. Numbers perished in the morass, and the rest, in confusion and dismay, escaped to their ships. These, my Lord, are my ideas of the principles on which Miltiades acted, and what I have conceived to have been the plan of the battle, from seeing the plains on which it was fought. I am, however, aware that one of the causes to which I attribute the success of the Greeks--their out-fronting the enemy--was a less advantage in those days, than it has become since the invention of musketry and artillery. But although the Grecians made their grand exertions by close action, yet it is to be presumed, from the hilly, irregular country in which this army was generally to act, that it was not without a considerable corps of slingers and bowmen, who, in the disposition I have given, might act to the greatest advantage upon the enemy's flank. It is needless to say that the Persians, by forming _en potence_ along the sides of the morass, might have brought as many men into action as the Greeks; they were too much confused by the sudden attack, bordering on a surprise, to execute this manœuvre, and most likely their troops with missive weapons were not in this part of their army.