It should be understood, that a Woman[167] cannot, during the life of her Husband, make any disposition of her Dower.[168] For since the Wife herself is in a legal sense under the absolute power of her Husband, it is not singular, if the Dower, as well as the Woman herself and all other things belonging to her, should be considered to be fully at the disposal of the Husband. But any one, having a Wife, may either give or sell her Dower, or, by any other mode he pleases, may alienate it in his lifetime; so that the Wife shall be bound to conform to his will in this as in all other respects which are not contrary to the Law of God. And so far is the Woman bound to obey her Husband, that if her Husband chuses to sell her Dower, and she refuses her consent, and the Dower be afterwards sold and bought under these circumstances, the Wife cannot[169] after the death of her Husband claim her Dower as against the Purchaser, if she confess in Court or is convicted upon the fact that, although she opposed her Husband, the Dower was sold by him. [Footnote 167: _Mulier_ is the expression which our Author generally uses, to designate the Wife: but, as Lord Coke informs us, this Term was anciently taken for a wife. (2. Inst. 434.)] [Footnote 168: For which Rule Bracton gives two reasons: _1st._ Because the woman has no freehold in her Dower, previously to its being assigned. _2ly._ Because she cannot gainsay her Husband. (Bracton 95. b.)] [Footnote 169: I have followed all the MSS. and the Edition of Glanville published in 1604, in admitting _not_ into the text. I submit, that this Reading is sanctioned not merely by the previous part of this present chapter, but also by the 13th chapter of the present Book. Yet the Regiam Majestatem makes the validity of such a sale to depend upon the wife’s consent—but, if she made no opposition to it, it seems to have been tantamount to a positive consent. (L. 2. c. 15. 16.) From considering the 13th Chapter of the present Book, one thing seems clear—that in case the Husband disposed of his Wife’s dower, the Heir was bound to render an equivalent to the Purchaser, if the Land was recovered from him, or to the Wife, if it was not so. As to the Heir, therefore, it was immaterial; and so it perhaps might be considered with respect to the Wife and the Purchaser, in case the Heir, as Heir, were solvent; but if otherwise, it was highly material to ascertain, whose right, that of the Wife or that of the Purchaser, was paramount. Bracton is more explicit than our Author; and from him we collect, that a distinction should be made, whether the Dower was originally _named_, or not. In the _former_ case, the woman could pursue the identical Dower, and wrest it from the hands even of a Purchaser. In the _latter_ she was obliged to resort to the Heir for an Equivalent. In the first case, from the moment the dower was named, the woman acquired a certain _jus et dominium_ as Bracton expresses it, in the property, which