291. ‘’Tis evident that all reasonings from causes or effects terminate in conclusions concerning matter of fact, _i.e._ concerning the existence of objects or of their qualities’; [1] in other words, in belief. If this meant a new idea, an idea that we have not previously had, it would follow that inference could really carry us beyond sense, that there could be an idea not copied from any prior impression. But according to Hume it does not mean this. ‘The idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent;’ [2] and not only so, ‘the _belief_ of existence joins no new ideas to those which compose the idea of the object. When I think of God, when I think of him as existent, and when I believe him to be existent, my idea of him neither increases nor diminishes’. [3] In what then lies the difference between incredulity and belief; between an ‘idea assented to,’ or an object believed to exist, and a fictitious object or idea from which we dissent? The answer is, ‘not in the parts or composition of the idea, but in the manner of conceiving it,’ which must be understood to mean the manner of ‘feeling’ it; and this difference is further explained to lie in ‘the superior force, or vivacity, or steadiness’ with which it is felt.’ [4] We are thus brought to the further question, how it is that this ‘superior vivacity’ belongs to the inferred idea when we ‘reason’ from cause to effect or from effect to cause. The answer here is that the ‘impression of the memory or senses,’ which in virtue of a ‘natural relation’ suggests the idea, also ‘communicates to it a share of its force or vivacity.’ [1] P. 394. [Book I, part III., sec. VII.] [2] P. 370. [Book I, part II., sec. VI.] [3] P. 395. [Book I, part III., sec. II.] [4] P. 398 [Book I, part III., sec. VII.]. Cf. above, par. 170, for the corresponding view in Berkeley. It results that necessary connection is an impression of reflection, _i.e._, a propensity to the transition described.