The Duke says, “Had they forced our position, instead of taking advantage of it and pressing on they must have turned round to face the Prussians, who were at that time in great force pressing the enemy’s right and rear.” Looking at the relative situations of Plancenoit, Mont-St.-Jean, and the French army, reckless as Napoleon had doubtless then become, it is still surprising he made the attack. [60] _See_ the prince de la Moskowa’s letter to the duc d’Otrante, Appendix, No. V, p. 253. [61] “Up, guards, and at them!” or, “Up, guards, make ready!” what an idea of mutual confidence between the general and his men, does that simple order convey! No haranguing, which, if it excites the soldiers, also expresses a doubt of their exertions; nothing of that kind was considered necessary, but a command, which, from its very simplicity, shows the entire conviction, in the mind of him who gave it, that it would be most effectually obeyed. [62] A column or columns advancing to an attack, although steady as on parade, on nearing the line of a cool determined enemy, must be quickly shattered by the converging fire, which would drop their leading and flank files, the only men that can really use their muskets; confused by different words of command from various officers, often enveloped in smoke and crowded together, the pressure is such, that every movement augments disorder and confusion. The imposing advance of large masses has often intimidated an enemy, notwithstanding they are only really formidable in the imagination, until deployed into line, during which evolution, a good volley, resolutely followed up by the application of the cold steel, would overthrow the best troops that ever pulled a trigger. The Duke says, “Napoleon did not manœuvre at all; he just moved forward in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style.” (_Letter to Lord Beresford_, July 2d, 1815, in the Appendix, No. II, p. 218.) I will not go so far as to say that moving forward in any other formation would have gained them the battle, but I do think the old style of advancing in columns did not give them a chance. [63] From the circumstance of the columns of the Imperial guard making their attack at the point of our line which ran curving forward, they must have become, on crowning the allied position, exposed to a cross-fire of all arms, which may be thus described: Halkett’s left and Vandersmissen’s batteries formed the left of the curve, whilst the immediate right of it consisted of Halkett’s right, our guards and Napier’s battery, whose right was brought rather forward; thus the fires were diagonal, that is, the two fires evidently crossed. It is therefore not astonishing that the veterans of a hundred fights gave way under this, to use their own words, _effroyable_ (dreadful) cross-fire upon both front and flank.