But that I may not be thought to over-rate the force of this squadron by ascribing to it a power of overturning the Spanish Government in America, it is necessary to enter into a more particular discussion, and to premise a few observations on the condition of the provinces bordering near the South Seas, and on the disposition of the inhabitants, both Spaniards and Indians, at that time. For hence it will appear that the conjuncture was the most favourable we could have desired, since we shall find that the Creolian subjects were disaffected and their governors at variance, that the country was wretchedly provided with arms and stores, and they had fallen into a total neglect of all military regulations in their garrisons; and that the Indians on their frontier were universally discontented, and seemed to be watching with impatience the favourable moment when they might take a severe revenge for the barbarities they had groaned under during more than two ages: so that every circumstance concurred to facilitate the enterprizes of our squadron. Of all these articles we were amply informed by the letters we took on board our prizes; none of these vessels, as I remember, having had the precaution to throw their papers overboard. The ill blood amongst the governors was greatly augmented by their apprehensions of our squadron; for every one being {259} willing to have it believed that the bad condition of his government was not the effect of negligence, there were continual demands and remonstrances among them in order to throw the blame upon each other. Thus, for instance, the President of St. Jago in Chili, the President of Panama, and many other governors and military officers were perpetually soliciting the Viceroy of Peru to furnish them with the necessary sums of money for putting their provinces and places in a proper state of defence to oppose our designs: but the customary answer of the viceroy to these representations was that he was unable to comply with their requests, urging the emptiness of the royal chest at Lima, and the difficulties he was under to support the expences of his own government: he in one of his letters (which we intercepted) mentioning his apprehensions that he might soon be necessitated to stop the pay of the troops and even of the garrison of Callao, the key of the whole kingdom of Peru. Indeed he did at times remit to these governors some part of their demands; but as what he sent them was greatly short of their wants, these partial supplies rather tended to the raising jealousies and heart-burnings among them than contributed to the purposes for which they had at first been desired.