Now let it in the next place be considered what were the events which we had to fear, or what were the circumstances which could have prevented us from giving law to all the coast of South America, and thereby cutting off from Spain the resources which she drew from those immense provinces. By sea there was no force capable of opposing us; for how soon soever we had sailed, Pizarro's squadron could not have sailed sooner than it did, and therefore could not have avoided the fate it met with. As we should have been masters of the ports of Chili, we could thereby have supplied ourselves with the provisions we wanted in the greatest plenty; and from Baldivia to the equinoctial we ran no risque of losing our men by sickness (that being of all climates the most temperate and healthy), nor of having our ships disabled by bad weather. And had we wanted sailors to assist in the navigating of our squadron whilst a considerable proportion of our men were employed on shore, we could not have failed of getting whatever numbers we pleased in the ports we should have taken, and from the prizes which would have fallen into our hands. For I must observe that the Indians, who are the principal mariners in that part of the world, {266} are extremely docile and dexterous; and though they are not fit to struggle with the inclemencies of a cold climate, yet in temperate seas they are most useful and laborious seamen. Thus then it appears what important revolutions might have been brought about by our squadron had it departed from England as early as it ought to have done: and from hence it is easy to conclude what immense advantages might have thence accrued to the public. For, as on our success it would have been impossible that the kingdom of Spain should have received any treasure from the provinces bordering on the South Seas, or should even have had any communication with them, it is certain that the whole attention of that monarchy would have been immediately employed in endeavouring to regain these inestimable territories, either by force of arms or compact. By the first of these methods it was scarcely possible they could succeed; for it must have been at least a twelvemonth after our arrival before any ships from Spain could have got into the South Seas, and when they had been there, they would have found themselves without resource, since they would probably have been separated, disabled, and sickly, and would then have had no port remaining in their possession where they could either rendezvous or refit. Whilst we might have been supplied across the isthmus with whatever necessaries, stores, or even men we wanted; and might thereby have supported our squadron in as good a plight as when it first set sail from St. Helens. In short, it required but little prudence so to have conducted this business as to have rendered all the efforts of Spain, seconded by the power of France, ineffectual, and to