A West Pointer with the Boers: $b personal narrative of Colonel J. Y. F. Blake, commander of the Irish brigadeBlake, John Y. Fillmore
History
A West Pointer with the Boers: $b personal narrative of Colonel J. Y. F. Blake, commander of the Irish brigade
Blake, John Y. Fillmore
South African War, 1899-1902
Kimberley could have easily been taken, but here another factor came
in. To take the place, all the Boers had to do was to destroy De Aar
Junction, the supply depot there, and the branch line to Kimberley.
Having done this, the next step was to proceed on the Cape Railway
line and destroy it. The English could have done nothing without these
lines, and Kimberley would have fallen without one shot being fired.
But President Steyn prevented this because it put the Dutch Cape
Ministry in a bad dilemma. This Ministry was friendly to the Boers and
no doubt wished them every success, but had the Boers proceeded as I
have suggested, the British Government would have charged the Ministry
with treasonable conduct. So De Aar Junction and all the railway lines
were allowed to remain in good order for the use of Lord Roberts and
his army. The Boers in their every act were always swayed by their
love of justice and humanity, and were always ready to sacrifice
themselves in order to do good to others. It was a vital mistake they
made, and I repeatedly told them so, because they knew, and I knew,
that the liberty and independence of their land were at stake. I used
to beg General Joubert to throw the whole force of the Boers in the
Free State into Cape Colony and destroy all bridges and railway lines,
for I knew, if this was done, we would get 15,000 or 20,000 recruits in
Cape Colony, and the English could never then push their way across the
Orange River. But the good, humane General Joubert would never consent
to do anything that might cause trouble for his friends in Cape Town. I
respected him for the stand he took; in fact, I admired and loved him
for it; but it was not business in dealing with such an unscrupulous
enemy as Great Britain.
Ladysmith and Kimberley were practically relieved on the same day,
February 27th, and a few days afterwards followed the relief of
Mafeking. To lay siege to Mafeking was positively foolish, and had
the Boers allowed General Baden-Powell to come out, why, they would
have had him and all his men in Pretoria for their Christmas dinner at
President Kruger's expense. Mafeking was of little or no importance to
either party in the war, so long as the English were not permitted to
cross the Orange River, and they never could have crossed or reached
the Orange River if all the bridges and railways in Cape Colony had
been destroyed. The Karoo, a wide desert, must first be crossed, and no
large army would dare make the venture of crossing.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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