A Woman's Philosophy of Woman; or, Woman affranchised.: An answer to Michelet, Proudhon, Girardin, Legouvé, Comte, and other modern innovatorsHéricourt, Madame d'
Philosophy
A Woman's Philosophy of Woman; or, Woman affranchised.: An answer to Michelet, Proudhon, Girardin, Legouvé, Comte, and other modern innovators
Héricourt, Madame d'
Women's rights -- France
AUTHOR. Children do not belong to their parents because they are not
THINGS: to those who obstinately persist in believing them _property_, we
say that Society has the right of dispossession for the public good. Then
the social right over children is limited so far as principles are
concerned to those of morality. Society has no right over religious
beliefs which belong to the domain of spiritual jurisdiction. The power
that should take away children from their parents because they were not
of a certain religious faith would be guilty of despotism, and would
merit universal execration. If you say that Society has no right to
impose a dogma upon children, you speak truly; but I cannot conceive how
you can entertain the thought of forbidding it the right to teach them,
even against the will of their parents, enlightening science, purifying
morality. Is it not the duty of society to secure the progress of its
members, and can any one have a right to keep a human being in ignorance
and evil?
READER. You are right, and I condemn myself. Let us return to Marriage. I
see with pleasure that you differ in opinion from a number of modern
innovators who deny the lawfulness of social interference in the union of
the sexes.
AUTHOR. If the union were without protection, who would suffer by it? Not
men, but rather women and children.
No one can compel a man to live with a woman whom he has ceased to love;
but he must be constrained to fulfill his duties with respect to the
children born of this union, and to keep his business engagements: in
wronging his companion and escaping from the burdens of paternity, he
takes advantage of his liberty to the detriment of others: Society has a
right to prevent this.
READER. So you do not grant to Society the right of binding souls or
bodies; but that of guaranteeing the contract of Marriage, and the
obligations of the spouses towards their future children; of forcing
them, in case of separation, to fulfill this last obligation?
AUTHOR. Yes; thus in case of the rupture of the marriage tie, society has
only to state publicly the responsibilities of the spouses, the number of
children, and the name of the parent on whom their guardianship devolves,
either by mutual consent or by social authority. And in confining itself
to this part, Society would do more to prevent the separation of married
couples than by all that it has hitherto foolishly invented for the
purpose. The parties would be free to marry again; but what woman would
be willing to unite herself to a man who was burdened with several
children, or who had treated his first companion unkindly? What man would
consent to wed a woman in the same position?
Do you not think that the difficulty that would be experienced in
contracting a new marriage would be a curb on the inconstancy and bad
conduct that lead to a rupture?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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