On April 8, discharging the obligation of warning, Mr. Lincoln notified General Beauregard that an attempt would be made to put provisions into Sumter, but not at present to put in men, arms, or ammunition, unless the fort should be attacked. Thereupon Beauregard, at two o'clock P.M. on April 11, sent to Anderson a request for a surrender. Anderson refused, remarking incidentally that he should be starved out in a few days. At 3.20 A.M., on April 12, Beauregard notified Anderson that he should open fire in one hour. That morning the occupants of Sumter, 9 commissioned officers, 68 non-commissioned officers and privates, 8 musicians, and 43 laborers, breakfasted on pork and water, the last rations in the fort. Before daybreak the Confederate batteries were pouring shot and shell against the walls. Response was made from as many guns as the small body of defenders could handle. But the fort was more easily damaged than were the works on the mainland, and on the morning of the 13th, the officers' quarters having caught fire, and the magazine being so imperiled that it had to be closed and covered with earth, the fort became untenable. Early in the evening terms of capitulation were agreed upon. Meantime three transports of the relief expedition were lying outside the bar. The first arrived shortly before the bombardment began, the other two came only a trifle later. All day long these vessels lay to, wondering why the Powhatan did not appear. Had she been there upon the critical night of the 12th, the needed supplies could have been thrown into the fort, for the weather was so dark that the rebel patrol was useless, and it was actually believed in Charleston that the relief had been accomplished. But the Powhatan was far away steaming at full speed for Pensacola. For this sad blunder Lincoln generously, but fairly enough, took the blame to himself. The only excuse which has ever been advanced in behalf of Mr. Lincoln is that he allowed himself to be led blindfold through this important business by Mr. Seward, and that he signed such papers as the secretary of state presented to him without learning their purport and bearing. But such an excuse, even if it can be believed, seems fully as bad as the blunder which it is designed to palliate.