The other matter was the division of the army of the Potomac into four army corps, to be commanded respectively by the four senior generals of division, viz., McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes. The propriety of this action had been for some time under consideration, and the step was now forced upon Mr. Lincoln by the strenuous insistence of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. That so large an army required organization by corps was admitted; but McClellan had desired to defer the arrangement until his generals of division should have had some actual experience in the field, whereby their comparative fitness for higher responsibilities could be measured. An incapable corps commander was a much more dangerous man than an incapable commander of a division or brigade. The commander naturally felt the action now taken by the President to be a slight, and he attributed it to pressure by the band of civilian advisers whose untiring hostility he returned with unutterable contempt. Not only was the taking of the step at this time contrary to his advice, but he was not even consulted in the selection of his own subordinates, who were set in these important positions by the blind rule of seniority, and not in accordance with his opinion of comparative merit. His irritation was perhaps not entirely unjustifiable. FOOTNOTES: [146] A reconnoissance or "slight demonstration" ordered for the day before by McClellan had been completed, and is not to be confounded with this movement, for which he was not responsible. [147] For example, see his _Own Story_, 82; but, unfortunately, one may refer to that book _passim_ for evidence of the statement. [148] N. and H. iv. 469. [149] _Ibid._ v. 140. [150] Letter to Lincoln, February 3, 1862. [151] _Army of Potomac_, 97. Swinton says: "He should have made the lightest possible draft on the indulgence of the people." _Ibid._ 69. General Webb says: "He drew too heavily upon the faith of the public." _The Peninsula_, 12. [152] The Southern generals had a similar propensity to overestimate the opposing force; _e.g._, Johnston's _Narrative_, 108, where he puts the Northern force at 140,000, when in fact it was 58,000; and on p. 112 his statement is even worse. [153] The Southerners also had the same notion, hoping by one great victory to discourage and convince the North and make peace on the basis of independence; _e.g._, see Johnston's _Narrative_ 113, 115. Grant likewise had the notion of a decisive battle. _Memoirs_, i. 368. [154] The position taken by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, I think, fully warrants this language. [155] General Palfrey says of this committee that "the worst spirit of the Inquisition characterized their doings." _The Antietam and Fredericksburg_ (Campaigns of Civil War Series), 182. [156] Through Stanton; McClellan, _Own Story_, 156.