Mr. JACKSON.--I believe this House, and the other branch of the Legislature, have the power, by the constitution, to pass a law, obliging the officers of the State Governments to take the oath required by the constitution that their States have adopted, and which has become the supreme law of the land. I believe the general opinion of the House inclines to favor this sentiment. It then only remains to examine the measure on the principle of policy. Here I must give my opinion. I believe, sir, that it is not time to bring it forward, that it is not expedient at present, because some jealousies exist respecting the jurisdiction of the Federal and State Governments. The States had better be left to regulate this matter among themselves, for an oath that is not voluntary is seldom held sacred. Compelling people to swear to support the constitution, will be like the attempts of Britain, during the late revolution, to secure the fidelity of those who fell within the influence of her arms, and, like those attempts, they will be frustrated; the moment the party could get from under her wings, the oath of allegiance was disregarded. If the State officers will not willingly pay this testimony of their attachment to the constitution, what is extorted from them against their inclination is not much to be relied on. Besides, it argues a jealousy in the National Government, which can have no foundation. Can any thing show more friendly to the Union than adopting the constitution, and sending us here to administer it? If we judge from these circumstances, there is good reason to believe that the State Governments will pay a proper attention to the duty enjoined upon them by the constitution. I shall readily agree, if they do not pay this attention, that the National Legislature ought to exercise its powers to compel them; but they know the necessity there is for conforming to what the constitution orders; if they neglect it, it becomes in some degree a relinquishment of their power in government. No State Legislature can pass an act that will have the efficacy of a law. Suppose a judge on the bench were to condemn a criminal to die for an offence; the sentence could not be carried into execution, if the judge had omitted to qualify himself for the discharge of the duties of his office. In short, there would be a total stagnation of the Government, its vital powers would be suspended, until they were revived by the action of the constitution. Besides, the constitution partakes of the nature of a compact; it guaranties to the State Governments the principles of a republican government, conditionally, that the States conform themselves to what is declared in the constitution; they must therefore take the oath directed by the constitution, or infringe the compact; in which case I apprehend, the guaranty is virtually withdrawn; this is another inducement for the States to perform their duty.