It appears to me that if we lay high duties on the importation of goods, a system of smuggling will be adopted before we can possibly make the necessary provision to prevent it. I take it, sir, that proper regulations respecting the collection is all our security against illicit trade. From a variety of circumstances, it appears to me, we shall not only be a long time in completing such a system, but, for want of experience, many of the regulations will be of a dubious propriety. Gentlemen will recollect we have an extensive sea-coast, accessible at a thousand points, and upon all this coast there are but few custom-houses where officers can be stationed to guard the collection of the duties; therefore, we labor under considerably greater disadvantages than a thicker settled country is liable to. I apprehend, if we consider the present state of our population, we shall conclude it impracticable to establish a sufficient number of custom-houses on those parts of the coast most assailable, to render us perfectly secure in the collection of our duties. If it were practicable, the expense would be a formidable objection; it would require more revenue to support such a system than all we shall derive from the impost. But we know in Great Britain where the duties are high, no expense is spared in the collection, yet smuggling is carried on to a very considerable amount; the risk run by this class of people is very great, the penalties are very severe, and the vigilance of the officers renders detection not very improbable. As this is the case, under the administration of a very powerful Government, I apprehend ours, which is only in its infancy, will be unable to prevent it taking place, otherwise than by a system of moderate duties. If we begin with laying them high, there will be an immediate temptation to engage in a system of smuggling, a system of which may soon be formed, so as to render our future efforts ineffectual; it is better to avoid the temptation, than to punish the evil. A man that is disposed to trade fairly, will be brought under the necessity of falling into the same practice, or giving up his business; for the higher the duty, the greater the advantage the smuggler has over the fair trader, being compelled by necessity to engage in a contraband trade, or to forego the means of a livelihood. Smuggling will be no longer dishonorable, no longer difficult, and none will be found opposing the practice; repeated efforts to corrupt will be successful among even the officers of your customs; they at first may resist the temptation, but when they find the practice general, their vigilance will wink at a contraband trade, and smuggling will be considered as a matter of course. They will consider the reward given them for being out of the way as a benefit to which they are entitled. For these reasons, I shall be against a system of high duties, and because I fear there is danger of a system of smuggling being introduced before proper