Mr. SMITH, of South Carolina, was also in favor of the clause; he conceived the only reason of weight urged against it, related to the restoration of public credit; but he thought every person possessed of the stock or debt of the United States would have the same feelings and reasoning as the House; they would know that their demands depended upon a higher source than Congress, and might be sure that we would do our duty in making particular provision. If Congress neglected this, one part of the creditors would compel them. If it was found that the United States were not disposed to pay their debts, foreigners would find the means to make them. Taking it therefore for granted, that Congress would always provide for these objects, he would proceed to consider what effect might arise from a permanent or temporary provision. If the latter were made, the creditors would honor us for our exertions, and confide in our continuing to provide for them in the manner we should find upon experience most convenient to the community. If the system was declared to be a perpetual provision for the payment of their interest, it would give no hope, in the first place, for the redemption of the capital; and in the second, if Congress were to alter it, and which, in all probability they shortly must, the security would be impaired, and an essential injury done to the public credit, which we are so desirous to revive. Mr. AMES considered this as a very important question; and in order that his own mind might be fully enlightened, he had listened with the most unwearied attention to the arguments urged on both sides; but he was far from being satisfied that the motion was necessary or proper for the House to adopt. Gentlemen tell us they are willing to make the revenue commensurate with the debt. If they do this, all the inconveniences resulting from the imperfection of the system will be entailed upon us for a number of years. Other gentlemen mention a year or two for its limitation. Can the House listen seriously to such a proposition? If we were to tell our creditors that we are making provision for them for one year, would it tend to inspire them with confidence in our wisdom or justice? Would our foreign creditors believe we were scrupulously fulfilling our engagements with them? No: nothing less than a fixed, permanent system, can beget confidence or give security. An illusory system of one or two years' duration would engender distrust; its very visage would make the public suspect deception. If we do not mean to deceive, why not make the provision commensurate to the occasion? His idea of a temporary act was _pro hac vice_, by way of experiment: but he thought the House could not make the experiment with this bill, because the public credit would not admit of it. If this act be made for one year, will it not be a considerable expense to the public by going over all the ground again, which had taken the House such a length of time to discuss?