Mr. SYLVESTER thought the constitution ought to have a liberal construction, and therefore was of opinion that the clause relative to the removal by impeachment was intended as a check upon the President, as already mentioned by some gentlemen, and to secure to the people, by means of their representatives, a constitutional mode of obtaining justice against peculators and defaulters in office, who might be protected by the persons appointing them. He apprehended the doctrine held out by the gentleman from South Carolina would involve the Government in great difficulties, if not in ruin, and he did not see it was a necessary construction of the constitution. Why, then, should the House search for a meaning, to make the constitution inconsistent with itself, when a more rational one is at hand? He, however, inclined at present to the sentiments of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. BLAND,) who thought the Senate ought to be joined with the President in the removal, as they were joined by the constitution in the appointment to office. Mr. GOODHUE was decidedly against combining the Senate in this business. He wished to make the President as responsible as possible for the conduct of the officers who were to execute the duties of his own branch of the Government. If the removal and appointment were placed in the hands of a numerous body, the responsibility would be lessened. He admitted there was a propriety in allowing the Senate to advise the President in the choice of officers; this the constitution had ordained for wise purposes; but there could be no real advantage arising from the concurrence of the Senate to the removal, but great disadvantages. It might beget faction and party, which would prevent the Senate from paying proper attention to the public business. Upon the whole, he concluded the community would be served by the best men when the Senate concurred with the President in the appointment; but if any oversight was committed, it could best be corrected by the superintending agent. It was the peculiar duty of the President to watch over the executive officers; but of what avail would be his inspection, unless he had a power to correct the abuses he might discover.