Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)United States. Congress
History
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 1 (of 16)
United States. Congress
Law -- United States; United States -- Politics and government
Mr. MADISON had intended to have given his sentiments on this subject;
but he was anticipated in some things by the gentleman last up. He
wished, in all cases of an executive nature, that the committee should
consider the powers that were to be exercised, and where that power was
too great to be trusted to an individual, proper care should be taken so
to regulate and check the exercise, as would give indubitable security
for the perfect preservation of the public interest, and to prevent that
suspicion which men of integrity were ever desirous of avoiding. This
was his intention in the present case. If the committee agreed to his
proposition, he intended to introduce principles of caution, which he
supposed would give satisfaction on that point. As far as was
practicable, he would have the various business of this important branch
of the Government divided and modified, so as to lull at least the
jealousy expressed by the gentleman from Massachusetts; indeed, he
supposed, with the assistance of the committee, it might be formed so as
to give satisfaction. He had no doubt but that the offices might be so
constituted as to restrain and check each other; and unless an unbounded
combination took place, which he could by no means suppose was likely to
be the case, that the public would be safe and secure under the
administration. He would favor the arrangement mentioned by the worthy
gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. BALDWIN,) and after that was
separated from the Secretary's duties, he believed the officer would
find sufficient business to employ his time and talents in rendering
essential services to his country. This arrangement he considered would
answer most of the objections which had been urged.
If a board is established, the independent officers of Comptroller and
Auditor are unknown; you then give the aggregate of these powers to the
board, the members of which are equal; therefore you give more power to
each individual than is proposed to be trusted in the Secretary; and if
apprehensions are to be entertained of a combination, they apply as
forcibly in the case of two or three commissioners combining, as they do
in the case of the Secretary, Comptroller, and other officers. If
gentlemen permit these sentiments to have their full weight, and
consider the advantages arising from energy, system, and responsibility,
which were all in favor of his motion, he had no doubt of their
according with him on this question.
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