Mr. C. said that most seriously considering the principles of the Government in such a point of view as he had the honor to state to the committee, he was irresistibly impressed with the opinion that a legislative election of President or Vice President, whenever resorted to, should be restrained to the smallest number above a unit, or to those persons who have equal electoral votes. He considered it as a position clearly and unquestionably true, that if the field of election, when not decided by the voice of the people themselves, should be left too wide, more chances will there always be for the introduction of abuses in determining on a choice, if those whose province it shall be to decide, should be actuated by a spirit adverse to the public sentiment. Results ungrateful to the public feeling might indeed become sources of discontent truly to be lamented. The demon of discord might be called forth, and stalking over our land, might unfortunately produce a state of things very different from that peaceful, tranquil state, which would follow a decision more conformable to the will of the people. Such a decision he believed would be ensured were the election to be confined to those two persons only who had received the most ample testimony of the public confidence, or to those who had been stamped with equal testimonials of that confidence. Mr. SMILIE would wish one principle altered in the report of the select committee, viz: that which confined the election of the President to the three highest persons voted for. It was impossible for human wisdom to provide for all cases that might occur. Their time was not well spent in providing for cases extremely remote. He had but one object in view, the designation of office; and the more simple the proposition, the more likely they were to obtain this object. It should be recollected that the constitution was the act of the people, and ought not to be altered till inconveniences actually arise under it. He believed, though particular parts might be defective in theory, they ought not to be changed till practical inconveniences had been experienced. No such inconvenience had yet been felt from choosing the President from the five highest on the list. Is it, then, prudent to embarrass the great principle, in which they generally concurred, with incidental propositions, when there was no necessity for them? This amendment was to obtain the assent of thirteen legislative bodies before it would be binding. The simpler, then, the proposition, the more likely it was to succeed. His idea, therefore, was to leave the constitution as it now stood, so far as it related to a choice being made from the five highest, and only so far to change it as related to a designation of the office.