By the constitution, Mr. Randolph said, that House was vested with the sole power of impeachment. How this power was to be exercised must depend on their discretion, and on no other law or principle whatever: for “these cases are not to be ruled by the common or civil law, but by the law of Parliament.” That law of Parliament it remained with them to establish. It could not be matter of surprise that he, one of the leading principles of whose politics it was to support the weight of that branch of the Government, and to be jealous of executive influence--it could not surprise any one, that he should exert himself in behalf of the constitutional rights of that House. When he saw the importance which was attached to precedent, he was more than ever solicitous for that which they were then about to establish. He trusted that they would not consent to abridge the power with which the constitution had invested them--to reduce it below the standard which the English House of Commons had fixed as the measure of their own power in similar cases. A time might come when a wicked President and his flagitious ministers might so conduct themselves in office, as to make every man regret the proceedings of that day, in case they should suffer their power to sleep. The refusing to exercise it, then, would hereafter be adduced as a denial of its existence. Such might be the circumstances of the times, that no private man would dare to step forward with a specific charge against the Executive. If they should deny an inquiry without a specific charge, they would do all in their power to screen such a President and such ministers at a future day. It had been remarked that, in this government, an officer found guilty, on an impeachment, could not be punished capitally. The sentence could only remove him from office, and disqualify him, for ever after, from holding one under the United States. If, in a country where the accused may be brought to the block, free, unfettered inquiry is warranted against any rank however exalted--would it be denied here, where the punishment was comparatively light? Should they hold the other departments of the Government more inviolable than they were considered even in England? Would they afford to a criminal, Executive or Judiciary, a shelter denied by the law of that government? He hoped they would not. He trusted that they would give an example of their readiness to bring every offender to justice, however great might be his station. Mr. GRIFFIN.--I had hoped that no subject would have been agitated during this session which should have interrupted the tranquillity or disturbed the harmony of this House, so necessary to the faithful and correct discharge of our public duties; but, sir, I perceive, from the turn which the debate upon the resolution now before the House has taken, that sensations have been excited which I fear it will be difficult to allay.