not having the confidence of the people, or feeling the constitutional responsibility of his place, but attributing his elevation merely to accident, and conscious of the superior claims of others, will be without restraint upon his conduct, without that strong inducement to consult the wishes of the people, and to pursue the true interests of the nation, that the hope of popular applause, and the prospect of re-election, would offer. Such a state of things might be productive of incalculable evils; for it is, as I fear time will show, in the power of a President of the United States to bring this Government into contempt, and this country to disgrace, if not to ruin. Mr. PLUMER said that he had generally contented himself with expressing his opinion by a silent vote, but on a question which affected the rights of the smaller States, (one of which he had the honor to represent,) he requested the indulgence of the Senate to a few observations. He said the constitution had provided only two methods for obtaining amendments, and both are granted with great caution. If two-thirds of the several State Legislatures apply, Congress shall call a convention who are to propose amendments, which, when ratified by the conventions of three-fourths of the States, will be valid. If this mode is adopted, Congress have nothing to do but to ascertain the fact, whether the necessary number of States require a convention. If they do, a convention must be called. The State Legislatures are only to apply for a convention. They can neither propose nor decide the amendments. The other mode is, if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress deem it necessary to propose amendments, and three-fourths of the State Legislatures ratify them, they are valid. This is the present mode. The State Legislatures have nothing to do till after Congress has proposed the amendments, and then it is their exclusive province either to ratify or reject them. But they have no authority to direct or even request Congress to propose particular amendments for themselves to ratify. Instructions on this subject are therefore improper. It is an assumption of power, not the exercise of a right. It is an attempt to create an undue influence over Congress. It is prejudging the question before it is proposed by the only authority that has the constitutional right to move it. If these instructions are obligatory, our votes must be governed, not by the convictions of our own judgments, or the propriety and fitness of the measure, but by the mandates of other Legislatures. This would destroy one of the checks that the constitution has provided against innovation. State Legislatures may, on some subjects, instruct their Senators; but on this, their instructions ought not to influence, much less bind us, to propose amendments, unless we ourselves deem them necessary.