The Senate consists of two members from each State; and in this case, the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Senate are necessary. A majority of the Senate constitutes a quorum to do business, but that quorum is a majority of all the Senators that all the States are entitled to elect. This applies with equal force to the term “two-thirds of the Senate.” But in cases where from necessity a speedy decision is requisite, and where the concurrence of two-thirds is required, the constitution is explicit in confining that two-thirds to the members present, as in cases of treaties and impeachments; and also a fifth of the members present requesting the yeas and nays. If amendments can be constitutionally proposed by two-thirds of the Senate present, it will follow that twelve Senators, when only a quorum is present, may propose them against the will of twenty-two Senators. This amendment affects the relative interest and importance of the smaller States. The constitution requires the Electors of each State to vote for two men, one of whom to be President of the United States. This affords a degree of security to the small States against the views and ambition of the large States. It gives them weight and influence in the choice. By destroying this complex mode of choice, and introducing the simple principle of designation, the large States can with more ease elect their candidate. This amendment will enable the Electors from four States and a half to choose a President, against the will of the remaining twelve States and a half. Can such a change tend to conciliate and strengthen the Union? This amendment has a tendency to render the Vice President less respectable. He will be voted for not as President of the United States, but as President of the Senate, elected to preside over forms in this House. In electing a subordinate officer the Electors will not require those qualifications requisite for supreme command. The office of Vice President will be a sinecure. It will be brought to market and exposed to sale to procure votes for the President. Will the ambitious, aspiring candidate for the Presidency, will his friends and favorites promote the election of a man of talents, probity, and popularity for Vice President, and who may prove his rival? No! They will seek a man of moderate talents, whose ambition is bounded by that office, and whose influence will aid them in electing the President. This mode of election is calculated to increase corruption, promote intrigue, and aid inordinate ambition. The Vice President will be selected from some of the large States; he will have a casting vote in this House; and feeble indeed must his talents be, if his influence will not be equal to that of a member. This will, in fact, be giving to that State a third Senator.