This idea of federalism ought to be well discussed by the smaller States, before they will suffer it to produce the intended effect--that of exciting their jealousy against the larger. To him it appeared to be evidently incorrect. Two principles sustain our constitution: one a majority of the people, the other a majority of the States; the first was necessary to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the people; the last, to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the States. But both are founded in the principle of majority; and the effort of the constitution is to preserve this principle in relation both to the people and the States, so that neither species of sovereignty or independence should be able to destroy the other. Many illustrations might be adduced. That of amending the constitution will suffice. Three-fourths of the States must concur in this object, because a less number or a majority of States might not contain a majority of people; therefore, the constitution is not amendable by a majority of States, lest a species of State sovereignty might, under color of amending the constitution, infringe the right of the people. On the other hand, a majority of the people residing in the large States cannot amend the constitution, lest they should diminish or destroy the sovereignty of the small States, the federal Union, or federalism itself. Hence a concurrence of the States to amend the constitution became necessary, not because federalism was founded in the idea of minority, but for a reason the very reverse of that idea--that is, to cover the will both of a majority of the people and a majority of States, so as to preserve the great element of self-government, as it regarded State sovereignty, and also as it regarded the sovereignty of the people.