Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)United States. Congress
History
Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856, Vol. 3 (of 16)
United States. Congress
Law -- United States; United States -- Politics and government
The great check imposed upon executive power was a popular mode of
election; and the true object of jealousy, which ought to attract the
attention of the people of every State, is any circumstance tending
to diminish or destroy that check. It was also a primary intention of
the constitution to keep executive power independent of legislative;
and although a provision was made for its election by the House of
Representatives in a possible case, that possible case never was
intended to be converted into the active rule, so as to destroy in a
degree the line of separation and independency between the executive and
legislative power. The controversy is not therefore between larger and
smaller States, but between the people of every State and the House of
Representatives. Is it better that the people--a fair majority of the
popular principle--should elect executive power; or, that a minor faction
should be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this
majority, and throw the election into the House of Representatives? This
is the question. If this amendment should enable the popular principle
to elect executive power, and thus keep it separate and distinct from
legislation, the intention of the constitution, the interest of the
people, and the principles of our policy, will be preserved; and if so,
it is as I have often endeavored to prove in this debate, the interest of
the smaller States themselves, that the amendment should prevail. For,
sir, is an exposure of their Representatives to bribery and corruption
(a thing which may possibly happen at some future day, when men lose
that public virtue which now governs them) an acquisition more desirable
than all those great objects best (if not exclusively) attainable by
the election of executive power by the popular principle of the Federal
Government, as the constitution itself meditates and prefers?
So far, then, the amendment strictly coincides with the constitution and
with the interests of the people of every State in the Union. But suppose
by some rare accident the election should still be sent into the House of
Representatives, does not the amendment then afford cause of jealousy to
the smaller States? Sir, each State has but one vote, whether it is large
or small; and the President and Vice President are still to be chosen out
of five persons. Such is the constitution in both respects now. To have
enlarged the number of nominees, would have increased the occurrence of
an election by the House of Representatives; and if, as I have endeavored
to prove, it is for the interest of every State, that the election should
be made by the popular principle of Government and not by that House,
then it follows, that whatever would have a tendency to draw the election
into that House, is against the interest of every State in the Union; and
that every State in the Union is interested to avoid an enlargement of
the nominees, if it would have such a tendency.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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