§44. _Impediri ... fatebuntur_: essentially the same argument as in 33 at the end. _Occurretur_: not an imitation of εναντιουσθαι as Goer. says, but of απανταν, which occurs very frequently in Sext. _Sumpta_: the two premisses are in Gk. called together λημματα, separately λημμα and προσληψις (_sumptio et adsumptio_ _De Div_ II. 108). _Orationis_: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use this word like _ratio_ (συλλογισμος), cf. _De Leg._ I. 48 _conclusa oratio_. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26. _Profiteatur_: so ‛υπισχνεισθαι is often used by Sext. e.g. _A.M._ VIII. 283. _Patefacturum_: n. on 26, εκκαλυπτειν, εκκαλυπτικος, δηλωτικος (the last in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 277) often recur in Greek. _Primum esse ... nihil interesse_: there is no inconsistency. Carneades allowed that _visa_, _in themselves_, might be true or false, but affirmed that human faculties were incapable of distinguishing those _visa_ which proceed from real things and give a correct representation of the things, from those which either are mere phantoms or, having a real source, do not correctly represent it. Lucullus confuses _essential_ with _apparent_ difference. _Non iungitur_: a supposed case of διαρτησις, which is opposed to συναρτησις and explained in Sext. _A.M._ VIII. 430. §45. _Assentati_: here simply = _assensi_. _Praeteritis_: here used in the strong participial sense, "in the class of things passed over," cf. _in remissis_ _Orat._ 59. _Primum igitur ... sed tamen_: for the slight anacoluthia cf. Madv. _Gram._ 480. _Iis qui videntur_: Goer. _is qui videtur_, which is severely criticised by Madv. _Em._ 150. For Epicurus' view of sensation see n. on 79, 80. §§46--48. Summary. The refusal of people to assent to the innate clearness of some phenomena (εναργεια) is due to two causes, (1) they do not make a serious endeavour to see the light by which these phenomena are surrounded, (2) their faith is shaken by sceptic paradoxes (46). The sceptics argue thus: you allow that mere phantom sensations are often seen in dreams, why then do you not allow what is easier, that two sensations caused by two really existing things may be mistaken the one for the other? (47). Further, they urge that a phantom sensation produces very often the same effect as a real one. The dogmatists say they admit that mere phantom sensations _do_ command assent. Why should they not admit that they command assent when they so closely resemble real ones as to be indistinguishable from them? (48)