§73. _Democrito_: Cic., as Madv. remarks on _D.F._ I. 20, always exaggerates the merits of Democr. in order to depreciate the Epicureans, cf. _T.D._ I. 22, _De Div._ I. 5, II. 139, _N.D._ I. 120, _De Or._ I. 42. _Quintae classis_: a metaphor from the Roman military order. _Qui veri esse aliquid_, etc.: cf. _N.D._ I. 12 _non enim sumus ii quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed ii qui omnibus veris falsa quaedam adiuncta dicamus_. _Non obscuros sed tenebricosos_: "not merely dim but darkened." There is a reference here to the σκοτιη γνωσις of Democr., by which he meant that knowledge which stops at the superficial appearances of things as shown by sense. He was, however, by no means a sceptic, for he also held a γνησιη γνωσις, dealing with the realities of material existence, the atoms and the void, which exist ετεηι and not merely νομωι as appearances do. See R. and P. 51. §74. _Furere_: cf. 14. _Orbat sensibus_: cf. 61, and for the belief of Empedocles about the possibility of επιστημη see the remarks of Sextus _A.M._ VII. 123--4 qu. R. and P. 107, who say "_patet errare eos qui scepticis adnumerandum Empedoclem putabant_." _Sonum fundere_: similar expressions occur in _T.D._ III. 42, V. 73, _D.F._ II. 48. _Parmenides, Xenophanes_: these are the last men who ought to be charged with scepticism. They advanced indeed arguments against sense-knowledge, but held that real knowledge was attainable by the reason. Cf. Grote, _Plato_ I. 54, Zeller 501, R. and P. on Xenophanes and Parmenides. _Minus bonis_: Dav. qu. Plut. _De Audit._ 45 A, μεμψαιτο δ' αν τις Παρμενιδου την στιχοποιιαν. _Quamquam_: on the proper use of _quamquam_ in clauses where the verb is not expressed see _M.D.F._ V. 68 and cf. I. 5. _Quasi irati_: for the use of _quasi_ = almost cf. _In Verr. Act._ I. 22, _Orat._ 41. _Aiebas removendum_: for om. of _esse_ see n. on I. 43. _Perscripti sunt_: cf. n. on I. 16. _Scire se nihil se scire_: cf. I. 16, 44. The words referred to are in Plat. _Apol._ 21 εοικα γουν τουτου σμικρωι τινι αυτωι τουτωι σοφωτερος ειναι, ‛οτι α μη οιδα ουδε οιομαι ειδεναι, a very different statement from the _nihil sciri posse_ by which Cic. interprets it (cf. R. and P. 148). That επιστημη in the strict sense is impossible, is a doctrine which Socrates would have left to the Sophists. _De Platone_: the doctrine above mentioned is an absurd one to foist upon Plato. The dialogues of search as they are called, while exposing sham knowledge, all assume that the real επιστημη is attainable. _Ironiam_: the word was given in its Greek form in 15. _Nulla fuit ratio persequi_: n. on 17.