None could foresee the developments of the future. The activity of the Russians in Central Asia boded no good; and with the death of Dost Mahommed it was recognised that the resulting situation contained a challenge to the principles of the policy by which, in years gone by, we had proposed to guarantee the inviolability of Afghan territory. Indeed, an attitude of non-intervention was no longer politic; but, instead of seizing the opportunity presented by the death of Dost Mahommed and occupying the territories of Afghanistan for ourselves, we hesitated. Yet, if the passing visit of a Russian mission to Kabul in 1838 had been accounted sufficient warranty for the invasion of Afghanistan, how much more the massing of Russian forces upon its northern and north-western frontiers should have propelled us to a renewed display of energy in 1863. Unfortunately for ourselves, the logic of our position was destroyed irretrievably by the train of hostile circumstance which our supineness had set in motion. Whilst our politicians debated Russia had acted; and Shir Ali, Khan of Herat and son of Dost Mahommed, spurred by Russian promises and intrigues, began a movement against Azim, Khan of Kabul. Varying fortunes distinguished the efforts of the rival factions between 1863-1868; but at length, in 1868, Shir Ali prevailed and he became recognised as _de facto_ ruler of Afghanistan. For the moment the situation showed improvement, as Shir Ali veered from Russia to India. Practical assistance, in the shape of money and materials of war, was at once accorded him by the Government of India, between whose supreme chief, Lord Mayo, and himself as the ruler of Afghanistan a conference was arranged at Umballa in March of 1869. The outcome of this meeting, not by any means so definite as the interests of a trans-border policy demanded, was held to be sufficient to dispel the feelings of alarm which the prolonged military activities of Russia in the Trans-Caspian region had aroused. None the less, while the Russians were occupied with the conquest of Khiva and Shir Ali had been disappointed at the aloofness of the Indian Government, four momentous years 1869-1873 were passing. Their close revealed only the further and more complete estrangement of the Amir of Kabul through the amazing ineptitude with which the advisers of the Indian Government dealt with his difficulties. Bitter, indifferent, and relying upon the Russian promises of assistance of 1872, Shir Ali became openly defiant, repudiating all suggestions for any formal treaty of alliance, 1876-1877. At the same time, 1877, he flatly declined to admit to Kabul any British officers as the accredited representatives of the Government of India, although in 1878 he himself received a Russian mission there. With the failure of our own attempt (1878) to force a mission upon him, the Second Afghan War, 1878-1880, began. [Illustration: GANDAMAK BRIDGE, WHERE THE FAMOUS TREATY WAS SIGNED]