Afghanistan; Asia, Central -- Description and travel; Eastern question (Central Asia)
on February 26, 1906, in spite of previous official intimations from
the Foreign Office that Persia had acquiesced in the results of the
Mission, the Shah’s Government formally notified Sir Edward Grey of its
inability to accept and consequent rejection of the decision in respect
of the McMahon division of the waters of the Helmund. In a similar
manner, it may be remembered, Persia appealed against the decision
of the Goldsmid Mission with the result that its original terms were
confirmed. No genuine objection exists in this instance.
[Illustration:
2 1 3
OFFICERS OF THE MCMAHON MISSION
1. Colonel Sir A. H. McMahon, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.
2. Captain Ramsay, Personal Assistant to Colonel McMahon.
3. Captain Bell, C.I. Horse, Commanding Camel Corps.]
It is perhaps to be regretted that the most prominent result revealed
by the McMahon Mission was the pronounced antagonism of the Germans and
Russians to British interests in Persia. From the very beginning and
with deliberate intent, M. Miller wrongly described the intentions
and aims of the Mission, his ingenious fabrications ultimately finding
sympathetic shelter in the columns of the German Press. Germany’s
share in the persecution with which the Mission was followed has
passed unnoticed in this country. But at a moment when stupid people
are encouraging others of greater foolishness to commit the British
Government to very undesirable rapprochements with Berlin, it is
as well to reflect upon the real character of the niceties which
underlie German policy where Anglo-German interests are concerned.
Unfortunately, it is not always realised in Great Britain how much
weight a venal Press can give to the indefatigable inventions of
scurrilous, political gossipers. It may be, therefore, necessary to
say that not a particle of truth attaches to the many statements about
the McMahon Mission which appeared abroad in print. Ingenuous as the
mendacity and duplicity of M. Miller may be, it is incomprehensible
that any diplomatic official would circulate, without specific orders,
such lies and travesties of fact as were current in Seistan during
the sojourn of the Mission there. Whatever may appear to have been
the gist of M. Miller’s instructions from the Russian Minister in
Teheran, it is to be admitted that he acted up to the fullest limit of
his opportunities. Happily the malicious untruths and slanders, which
became so prominent a feature of the Russo-German press campaign, have
recoiled upon the Russian policy; and, while the arch purveyor of the
trash has been removed, Russian prestige itself has temporarily fallen
very low.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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