The forces over which he exerted complete control were confined to the Kabul territory, although in addition he exercised nominal jurisdiction over the tribal levies of the khanates of Kandahar and Herat. These divisions of the available forces presented the following effective establishment: _Kabul Territory._ _Kandahar Territory._ _Herat Territory._ Mounted 21,000 12,000 12,000 Dismounted 10,000 6,000 10,000 ------ ------ ------ Total 31,000 18,000 22,000 At the moment the fighting machine in Afghanistan was composed of those tribal chiefs, district land-owners and priests whose influence was sufficient to regulate the movement of any particular number of followers. At the first news of war the leaders of these several contingents hurried with their following to some central camp, the united strength constituting the army of the district ruler, although the component units of such a force owned allegiance to individual district chiefs rather than to any supreme authority. In addition to this combative force, there was usually another body which, although not drawn from the best material and less numerous, was possessed of greater experience than the main following. Composed of men who were attached to no individual leader, or made up of the numbers of some border ruffian, these auxiliaries participated in the operations for the purposes of loot and from pure love of war and bloodshed. In each case their weapons were of the crudest variety; very frequently the dismounted forces were armed solely with swords, spears and shields, the horsemen carrying matchlocks, flintlocks or ancient pistols. Every one was compelled to furnish his own weapons, the mounted men being responsible for their horses. The militia held the lands on condition of service and were exempt from all taxes on land except the tithe. The men were born fighters and each, so soon as he could wield a spear or manage a fire-arm, attached himself to some district chief. No regular rate of pay was made by the leader to his following who, if they failed to live upon their plunder, were indemnified by small grants of land, by the right of pasturage and by permission to adopt a trade. Upon the part of the chief, too, as between himself and the Khan of the territory, the scale of remuneration was never fixed, the sum varying according to his local influence and the number of men he could bring into the field. This condition of affairs, typical of most Asiatic hordes at the time, had always prevailed in Afghanistan. The success against other native armies of such a system, wherein no precautions were observed and no knowledge of military operations was required, was due to the great _élan_ in attack of the Afghans and to their undoubted courage, more than to any preconceived notion of the art of war.