The establishment of the regular and auxiliary forces, as they existed at this date, boasted no commissariat department. In districts, where the revenue was paid in grain, a certain proportion was allotted to each fort; if the troops were on the march, orders upon the headmen of the various villages were issued, the villages being credited with the amount of grain, etc., supplied when the revenue came to be collected. Upon any occasion where the whole available force was collected _en masse_, each district had to furnish a certain amount of grain as well as its fighting contingent, the daily ration of every man being estimated at one seer of flour. So long as this supply lasted the men considered themselves bound to remain with their chiefs; but the moment that the issue ceased there was a general dissolution of the forces. Similarly, there was no settled transport system nor ordnance supply, arrangements, haphazard in the extreme, rising as occasion required. In many respects, the changing conditions of military life, in the absence of specific reforms, brought no remedy of abuses which, existing under Dost Mahommed, found opportunity for increased activity in the new order of affairs. The inevitable break-down occurred; and at the first tests, imposed by the actions at Peiwar Kotal and Ali Masjid, the entire machine went to pieces. Later, at Charasiab and Ahmad Khel, the Afghan array had returned to its own style of fighting and, under tribal leaders, ill-disciplined, yet courageous and determined, fought valiantly and well.