The mullahs were now actively extolling the cause of the _jehad_ to their disciples when the persistent efforts of the Hadda Mullah to excite Mahommedan fanaticism in Swat, Bajaur and Dir were unexpectedly furthered by the appearance in Swat of the Mad Mullah. The companion of the Hadda Mullah in his recent stay in Kabul, he had come direct from the Afghan capital, declaring everywhere that a holy war had been proclaimed. Under the enthusiasm inspired by the eloquence of this restless spirit, the Mad Fakir’s progress through Swat was in the nature of a triumph. Thana had declared itself for him, when on July 26, the fury of the storm broke over Malakand and Chakdara. By August 1, a field force of two brigades under Major-General Sir Bindon Blood arrived at Malakand, where the opposing tribesmen numbered 20,000 men. Meanwhile, the apostles of the movement looked to Kabul for their orders. Letters and proclamations, purporting to describe the Amir’s interest in it, were issued; and, as the tribes rallied to his call, Hadda Mullah, relying upon the kindly offices of Ghulam Haidar and emulating the example of the Mad Fakir, led on August 7, an attack against the British frontier post at Shabkaddar. Unfortunately for Indo-Afghan relations the muster for this affair contained, besides several thousand Mohmands, a large proportion of Afghans from the Kunar valley, the Khugiani country, the Laughman and Jelalabad districts, the Basawal and Hazarnao villages, and soldiers in plain clothes from the Kabul garrison. It was no longer possible for the Government of India to ignore the complicity of the Afghan frontier officials. So pronounced was their sympathy with the rising that Abdur Rahman addressed a _firman_ to the Sipah Salar, containing an expression of his grave displeasure at their misconduct. Matters had gone too far to be adjusted by such means, and on August 13, 1897, Sir Richard Udny, instrumental with Brigadier-General (now Major-General Sir Edmond) Elles, who was commanding at Peshawar, in abandoning the Khyber Pass to the unsupported custody of Afridi militia, directed an emphatic remonstrance to the Amir of Afghanistan. His Highness was informed of the nature of the reports which had reached the Government of India, and was required to take immediate steps to recall his subjects and to prevent the repetition of so exceedingly grave an offence. After reminding the Amir that the Viceroy, in May 1896, had called his Highness’s attention to the unfriendly conduct of the Sipah Salar, the letter concluded as follows: It is impossible that Afghan sepoys can have joined in this attack without the knowledge of the Sipah Salar, and the Viceroy is constrained to warn your Highness that, if you do not control the Sipah Salar, or withdraw him from his command on the frontier, your Highness must be held responsible for his actions.