But in fact the so-called "safeguards" would not last. Professor Dicey[40] and Professor Morgan,[41] writing from opposite sides of the controversy, agree in holding that no colony would tolerate them for a moment; and it is incredible that Ireland, with a Parliament of her own, would submit to them for more than a few years.[42] Suppose the majority of the Irish Legislature to grow weary of the "safeguards," and to demand their repeal. The Imperial ministry might refuse, but the reply of the Irish ministry (if in command of a majority in the Irish House of Commons) would be to resign and to make the government of Ireland impossible except by force. And if Ireland were still represented in the Imperial Parliament, the new "sorrows of Ireland" would find eloquent and insistent expression there. What, then, would England do? What could she do, except, after a futile struggle, to give way? The truth is, that if you part with the executive power, all checks and "safeguards" are futile. Mr. Redmond[43] eagerly "accepts every one of them," and will accept others if desired; for he knows that they must prove ineffective. "If," said Lord Derby in 1887, "Ireland and England are not to be one, Ireland must be treated like Canada or Australia. All between is delusion or fraud." IRISH REPRESENTATION AT WESTMINSTER. The hybrid form of government proposed in the Home Rule Bills of 1886 and 1893 gave rise to a further difficulty, and one which went far towards wrecking them both. Should Ireland under Home Rule be represented at Westminster by its members and representative peers? Under a system of Gladstonian Home Rule there appear to be only three possible answers to this question. The Irish representatives may be excluded altogether, they may be retained altogether, or they may be retained in diminished numbers and with some limitation on their voting powers. The total exclusion clause in the Bill of 1886 was one of the most unpopular parts of an unpopular Bill. It was immediately urged that this arrangement was virtually equivalent to separation, and Mr. Gladstone admitted[44] that the argument had force. Since 1886 public sentiment has advanced in the direction of a closer Imperial unity, and it is unlikely that the country will recur in 1912 to a proposal which in 1886 was admitted to be intolerable. Moreover, if the British Parliament is to retain control of the whole foreign policy of the kingdom, and--what is likely to be of enormous importance in the future--of its whole fiscal policy, it would be manifestly unjust to deny to Ireland a voice and vote in such matters. How would it be possible, for instance, to discuss the effect upon agriculture of a Tariff Reform Budget in the absence of competent representatives of the Irish farmers, or to consider the yearly grant to be made (as it is said) in aid of Irish finance without the assistance of any representatives of Ireland?