Here, also, at the outbreak of the war the United States was practically without facilities. The only school was at Fort Omaha, Nebr., recovered from complete abandonment the previous November, with accommodations for 15 officers and 400 men, and equipment of balloon shed, gas plant, two obsolete captive balloons, and some telephone material. The original program of August 13 necessitated a very large expansion, fully comparable to that in the heavier-than-air branch. To meet the program the Fort Omaha school was enlarged in September to accommodate 61 officers and 1,200 men; on December 28 Camp John Wise was opened at San Antonio with a final capacity of 150 officers and 2,200 men, and special companies were sent to Fort Sill, Okla., for cooperation with the Coast Artillery. By June 30, 440 balloon officers had graduated, of whom 155 were fully qualified observers, and 73 had been sent overseas. The enlisted strength stood at 9,621 with 1,382 abroad. Thus, by the end of the fiscal year, the Air Service had in operation an educational system complete in all the details necessary to man this intricate service. Fields, curricula, instructors, and equipment were on hand for the most diverse courses, and men were graduating in hundreds trained to all the difficulties of operating aeroplanes and translating their work into effective action. A total of 34,209 men had been graduated from the various courses, with 20,976 men enrolled in 50 schools of 16 different types. Many outside bodies were called upon to cooperate in this development. Great Britain, France, and Italy all early established large aviation missions in Washington which brought their three years of experience to help solve problems confronted here for the first time. The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, the Bureau of Standards, and several joint Army and Navy Boards also added their information on the subject. Nevertheless the work was carried out under extreme difficulties. Operation and production were not properly coordinated. Much time was lost in having to obtain the necessary authority to build a new field or secure increases in personnel, instead of being able to carry out a main program with full independence and authority. Moreover, experienced and trained personnel was lacking; work had to be done while the actual organization to do it was being built up; much time was lost in the expansion and moving about of offices in Washington, some half a dozen times; while officers were constantly being shifted between Washington, the fields, and overseas.