The notes of the Bank of the United States, payable on demand in gold and silver at the counters of the bank, or any of its branches, were, by its charter, receivable in all payments to the United States; but this quality was also stripped from them on March 19, 1812, by a repeal of the act according it. To these disturbances of the financial equilibrium of the country was added the necessary withdrawal of fifteen millions of bank credit and its transfer to other institutions. This gave an extraordinary impulse to the establishment of local banks, each eager for a share of the profits. The capital of the country, instead of being concentrated, was dissipated. Between January 1, 1811, and 1815, one hundred and twenty new banks were chartered, and forty millions of dollars were added to the banking capital. To realize profits, the issues of paper were pushed to the extreme of possible circulation. Meanwhile New England kept aloof from the nation. The specie in the vaults of the banks of Massachusetts rose from $1,706,000 on June 1, 1811, to $7,326,000 on June 1, 1814. This was a consequence of the New England policy of opposition. Mr. Gallatin estimated that the proceeds of loans, exclusive of treasury notes and temporary loans, paid into the treasury from the commencement of the war to the end of the year 1814 were $41,010,000: of which sum the Eastern States lent $2,900,000; the Middle States, $35,790,000; Southwestern States, $2,320,000. The floating debt of the United States, consisting of treasury notes and temporary loans unpaid, amounted, January 1, 1815, to $11,250,000, of which nearly four fifths were loaned by the cities of New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and the District of Columbia. The suspension of the banks was precipitated by the capture of Washington. It began in Baltimore, which was threatened by the British, and was at once followed in Philadelphia and New York. Before the end of September all the banks south and west of New England had suspended specie payment. In his "Considerations on the Currency," Mr. Gallatin expressed his-- "deliberate opinion that the suspension might have been prevented at the time when it took place, had the Bank of the United States been in existence. The exaggerated increase of state banks, occasioned by the dissolution of that institution, would not have occurred. That bank would _as before_ have restrained them within proper bounds and checked their issues, and through the means of its offices it would have been in possession of the earliest symptoms of the approaching danger. It would have put the Treasury Department on its guard; both, acting in concert, would certainly have been able, at least, to retard the event; and as the treaty of peace was ratified within less than six months after the suspension took place, that catastrophe would have been avoided."