American ideals, and other essays, social and politicalRoosevelt, Theodore
General
American ideals, and other essays, social and political
Roosevelt, Theodore
National characteristics, American; United States -- Politics and government; United States -- Social conditions -- 1865-1918
In Mr. Pearson’s third chapter he dwells on some of the dangers of
political development, and in especial upon the increase of the town
at the expense of the country, and upon the growth of great standing
armies. Excessive urban development undoubtedly does constitute a real
and great danger. All that can be said about it is that it is quite
impossible to prophesy how long this growth will continue. Moreover,
some of the evils, as far as they really exist, will cure themselves.
If towns-people do, generation by generation, tend to become stunted
and weak, then they will die out, and the problem they cause will
not be permanent; while on the other hand, if the cities can be made
healthy, both physically and morally, the objections to them must
largely disappear. As for standing armies, Mr. Pearson here seems to
have too much thought of Europe only. In America and Australia there
is no danger of the upgrowing of great standing armies: and, as he well
shows, the fact that every citizen must undergo military training, is
by no means altogether a curse to the nations of Continental Europe.
There is one point, by the way, although a small point, where it
may be worth while to correct Mr. Pearson’s statement of a fact.
In dwelling on what is undoubtedly the truth, that raw militia are
utterly incompetent to make head against trained regular forces,
he finds it necessary to explain away the defeat at New Orleans.
In doing this, he repeats the story as it has been told by British
historians from Sir Archibald Alison to Goldwin Smith. I hasten to
say that the misstatement is entirely natural on Mr. Pearson’s part;
he was simply copying, without sufficiently careful investigation,
the legend adopted by one side to take the sting out of defeat. The
way he puts it is that six thousand British under Pakenham, without
artillery, were hurled against strong works defended by twice their
numbers, and were beaten, as they would have been beaten had the works
been defended by almost any troops in the world. In the first place,
Pakenham did not have six thousand men; he had almost ten thousand. In
the second place, the Americans, instead of being twice as numerous as
the British, were but little more than half as numerous. In the third
place, so far from being without artillery, the British were much
superior to the Americans in this respect. Finally, they assailed a
position very much less strong than that held by Soult when Wellington
beat him at Toulouse with the same troops which were defeated by
Jackson at New Orleans. The simple truth is that Jackson was a very
good general, and that he had under him troops whom he had trained in
successive campaigns against Indians and Spaniards, and that on the
three occasions when he brought Pakenham to battle--that is, the night
attack, the great artillery duel, and the open assault--the English
soldiers, though they fought with the utmost gallantry, were fairly and
decisively beaten.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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