The British Minister declined this proposition in the part that carried the line to the ocean, but offered to continue it from the summit of the mountains to the Columbia River, a distance of some three hundred miles, and then follow the river to the ocean. This was declined by Mr. Calhoun. The President had declared in his inaugural address in favor of the 54–40 line. He was in a dilemma; to maintain that position meant war with Great Britain; to recede from it seemed impossible. The proposition for the line of 49 degrees having been withdrawn by the American government on its non-acceptance by the British, had appeased the Democratic storm which had been raised against the President. Congress had come together under the loud cry of war, in which Mr. Cass was the leader, but followed by the body of the democracy, and backed and cheered by the whole democratic newspaper press. Under the authority and order of Congress notice had been served on Great Britain which was to abrogate the joint occupation of the country by the citizens of the two powers. It was finally resolved by the British Government to propose the line of 49 degrees, continuing to the ocean, as originally offered by Mr. Calhoun; and though the President was favorable to its acceptance, he could not, consistently with his previous acts, accept and make a treaty, on that basis. The Senate, with whom lies the power, under the constitution, of confirming or restricting all treaties, being favorable to it, without respect to party lines, resort was had, as in the early practice of the Government, to the President, asking the advice of the Senate upon the articles of a treaty before negotiation. A message was accordingly sent to the Senate, by the President, stating the proposition, and asking its advice, thus shifting the responsibility upon that body, and making the issue of peace or war depend upon its answer. The Senate advised the acceptance of the proposition, and the treaty was concluded. The conduct of the Whig Senators, without whose votes the advice would not have been given nor the treaty made, was patriotic in preferring their country to their party—in preventing a war with Great Britain—and saving the administration from itself and its party friends.