Americanization; Civics; Immigrants -- United States; Naturalization -- United States; Noncitizens -- United States
The Constitution of the United States gave to Congress exclusive
authority “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.”[83] It
might have been inferred that the intention was to make the process
strictly an affair of Federal administration; but Congress did not so
construe or utilize the authority. It established, by the original
statute and subsequent legislation, uniform standards of requirement
as to racial restriction, preliminary period of residence, literacy,
and moral qualifications; but in effect it gave the jurisdiction and
administration of the law back to the states--not in so many words,
to be sure, but by committing the naturalization function to local as
well as to Federal judges in every state and territory. Nothing could
have been devised more surely to subject the operation of the law to
the peculiarities of local conditions and feeling, and to the warps
and twists of personal notion.
From the beginning, in the first general naturalization law enacted
after the new republic got under way, the function of admitting new
members of the nation has been vested in the courts--a _judicial_
power and activity. So it remains to-day. And with the sole exception
of Canada, the United States is unique in respect of this method
of naturalization. England, France, and virtually all of the other
nations vest the power in some ministerial agency.[84]
A FUNCTION OF LOCAL COURTS
At first glance it might seem fitting and wise to confine the
function (if to the courts at all) to the _Federal_ tribunals, in
the interest of freedom from local political influence, uniformity
of interpretation and practice, and recognition of the fact that
citizenship is chiefly a relationship to the nation as a whole.
Always, indeed, there has been a considerable body of sentiment in
favor of such a change in the practice. Many of the state judges
would favor it; some for reasons of principle, but most because they
would gladly get rid of a body of duty which to many is irksome and
a distasteful interference with their ordinary matters of litigation
by duties which they regard as properly more administrative than
judicial. No Federal judge will hear of any such addition to their
already great burden of work.
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