The operation of the system certainly leaves the petitioner frequently, at least, in a most unsatisfactory and perilous posture; as witness the matter of the seven-year limitation upon “old-law declarations.” The crisis came in September, 1913, and there was a decision soon afterward in the United States District Court in New York ruling out all “old-law declarations.” A policy in regard to these declarations should have been made then--a unified policy, applicable throughout the Naturalization Service. Nothing of the sort was done; the decision was heeded in some districts and ignored in others, _for five years_!--until the Supreme Court of the United States, sustaining the holding of the District Court in New York, at one stroke guillotined, so to speak, thousands of declarants under the old law. In many other matters there is still not only uncertainty, but variety of interpretation and practice; a regrettable lack in effect of the “uniform rule” contemplated by the Constitution. In many courts the point of view of the judge and that of the naturalization examiner are at variance, and this leads in some cases to open bitterness. Some examiners quibble and irritate the judge with trivial objections; some judges constantly ignore important provisions of the law urged upon them by the examiners. Between such extremes the petitioner is a helpless shuttlecock at the time, and later the victim of cancellation proceedings. There are “too many cooks,” too little supervised and unified, and among them the petitioner’s broth is spoiled. One of the crying needs of the Naturalization Service is a permanent law officer, able and willing and vigilant to watch the making of the statutes and decisions all over the country, and to inform and guide the representatives of the service in their interpretation of the law. CONFUSED STATE OF THE EDUCATIONAL TEST It shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the court that, during five years at least immediately preceding the date of his application, he has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. Such is the substance of the law. It requires also that he must be able to _speak_ the English language, and that each of his precious two witnesses shall, of their own knowledge, certify that he is “in every way qualified, in their opinion, to be a citizen of the United States.” The barbed entanglement of technicalities through which the petitioner must grope before the questions of substantial qualification can be reached, we already have seen.