Turkey then, in being possessed of Wallachia and Moldavia on the present footing, is only favoured with a momentary advantage, very disproportionate to the danger of being involved through them in war against Russia, an event which must necessarily follow any attempts on the part of the latter to seize on the principalities, and which, according to the present political arrangements existing in Europe, would not fail to create again general convulsion. From these considerations, it would appear evident, that as long as the transdanubean provinces continue to be a source of discord between Russia and Turkey, and as long as the important question relating to them remains unsettled, peace and tranquillity in Europe will only be of imaginary stability. In the pacific sentiments which so eminently distinguish the Emperor Alexander, we have, indeed, a solid guarantee against any hostile attempts on Turkey; but the life of man being so precarious, is the hope of a long and uninterrupted peace to rest on the mere knowledge of that sovereign’s personal character? And even if the Emperor Alexander should, contrary to present expectations, march his armies again into Moldavia and Wallachia, for the purpose of taking permanent possession of them, could we, in strict justice, accuse him of ambition in the performance of an act which common humanity dictates to any Christian power? It is asserted that the success of the late great efforts against Buonaparte had, in a great measure, depended upon the Porte’s forbearing to take a part against Russia, and that the allies, in order to induce the Turkish cabinet to adhere to the resolution it had evinced of remaining neutral, had promised to guarantee, whatever might happen, the integrity of the Ottoman empire; that the Porte, subsequently relying on this promise, declared itself entirely foreign to the objects in discussion at the congress of Vienna, and consequently was not invited to send ministers to it.