4. The defendants were substantially deprived of the right of jury trial. The instructions of the Court to the jury were imperative. They were equivalent to a direction to find a verdict of guilty. It was said by the Court in the hearing of the jury, that the case was submitted to the jury "as a matter of form." The jury was not at liberty to exercise its own judgment upon the evidence, and without committing a gross discourtesy to the Court, could render no verdict except that of guilty. 5. Admitting that the defendants acted without malice, or any corrupt motive, and in accordance with their best judgments, and in perfect good faith, it was error to charge that that was no defense. 6. The defendants are admitted to have acted in accordance with their duty as defined by the laws of New York (_1 R.S., Edmond's Ed., pp. 126-127, sections 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19_) as construed by the Court of Appeals. (_People vs. Pease, 27 N.Y. 45._) They are administrative officers and bound to regard only the evidence which the Statute prescribes. They are not clothed with the power, to reject the vote of a person who has furnished the evidence, which the law requires, of right to vote, on what they or either of them might know, as to the truth or falsity of such evidences. They have no discretion, and must perform their duty, as it is defined by the laws of New York and the decisions of her Courts. 7. The defendant, William B. Hall, has been tried and convicted in his absence from the Court. This is an error fatal to the conviction in his case. The Court denied the motion. The Court then asked the defendants if they had anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced, in response to which Beverly W. Jones said: "Your honor has pronounced me guilty of crime; the jury had but little to do with it. In the performance of my duties as an inspector of election, which position I have held for the last four years, I acted conscientiously, faithfully and according to the best of my judgment and ability. I did not believe that I had a right to reject the ballot of a citizen who offered to vote, and who took the preliminary and general oaths; and answered all questions prescribed by law. The instructions furnished me by the State authorities declared that I had no such right. As far as the registry of the names is concerned, they would never have been placed upon the registry, if it had not been for Daniel Warner, the Democratic federal Supervisor of elections, appointed by this Court, who not only advised the registry, but addressed us, saying, 'Young men, do you know the penalty of the law if you refuse to register these names?' And after discharging my duties faithfully and honestly and to the best of my ability, if it is to vindicate the law that I am to be imprisoned, I willingly submit to the penalty." And Edwin T. Marsh said: