On the contrary, when there is a struggle between a sense of what is right and best, and the strongest desire, and a choice is made which involves self‐denial and self‐sacrifice, we feel that the act is one which is meritorious, and deserving of reward and praise. Any voluntary action, then, is _right_ which is conformed to those rules of rectitude which tend to secure _the most_ happiness for all, even when there is no temptation to another course. But an action is _meritorious_ and _rewardable_ only when there is a reference to the rules of rectitude in the mind of the actor and some degree of self‐denial. To choose what we desire most, without any regard to what is right or wrong, even when it chances that our choice is that which is _best_, and thus _right_, does not meet our idea of a meritorious and praiseworthy act. The greater portion of our choices are of those things which are good in all relations, as best for self and best for all concerned. Thus when we desire to eat, to drink, to breathe the pure air, to admire the beauties of nature, to enjoy the society of friends,—to choose these and a thousand other daily blessings, promotes our own best good and the best good of all concerned. In all such cases choosing what we desire most is morally _right_ in all relations. But no acts of choice are _meritorious_, except as they involve a regard to law in the mind of the actor, and some degree of self‐denial in conforming to rule. The only cases where moral evil (or wrong choices) can exist, are where desires are excited for some good, either for ourselves or for others, which is not _best for all concerned_. In all such cases there is a “bias,” “tendency,” and “propensity” to choose _good_ of some sort, but it is not the _best_ good, and therefore to choose it would be morally wrong. Thus there is a bias or propensity to what is good in one relation, but evil in another; good as tending to give enjoyment, but evil as contrary to a law which enjoins that the _best_ good should always be preferred. In such cases the _desires_ for a good which is not for the _best_ are not morally wrong, for they arise involuntarily from those susceptibilities implanted by God, which are not to be exterminated, but only regulated by law. The moral evil consists not in the _existence_ of such desires, but in _choosing_ to gratify them at the sacrifice of the best good of self or of others. It has been shown that one result of the wrong action of mind is such a change in its constitutional nature, that there will be a desire to inflict evil on others as a malignant pleasure to the guilty mind. In these cases such desires may properly be called _morally wrong_ because they are the result of the _voluntary_ action of the sinful mind, and not of the natural susceptibilities implanted by the Creator. As they result wholly from wrong previous choices, the guilty mind itself is the author of them and not the Creator of mind.