The question whether Adam was created with “a _holy_ nature,” while his posterity begin existence here with an “unholy nature,” must be settled by a clear definition of the words employed. If the term “nature” refers to the construction of the mind itself as made by God, a holy nature must signify that organization and combination of the natural powers of mind, which is the best possible for a mind in its appointed place in the best possible system. If, on the contrary, the term “nature” refers to that character of mind consequent on its own volitions, then a holy nature can be caused or created only by man himself as the sole _producing cause_ of his own volitions, God being the author or cause of this nature only in the sense in which men are causes of voluntary action in other minds, viz., _occasional causes_ by the use of _motives_ or objects that excite desires. CHAPTER XXIV. LOVE TO GOD AND LOVE TO MAN. In a former chapter we have noticed the analysis of the principle of _love_. It is needful to refer to this again, as intimately connected with the question of the right moral action of finite minds. We have seen that love is a complex exercise, its first element being agreeable emotions in view of certain qualities and actions. Combined with these emotions co‐exists a desire of reciprocated regard, that is to say, a desire to be the cause of similar agreeable emotions to the one loved. These are constitutional impulses not at all consequent on any volition or choice, and as the involuntary element of love, are properly called _involuntary love_. Such love can not be justly demanded except where those qualities are, or can be, perceived which naturally awaken agreeable emotions. In cases where the qualities exist that would naturally awaken affection if noticed, and the want of it is owing to inattention, a proper regard to such qualities can be justly demanded. But this is the only particular in which involuntary love can be made the subject of law and penalties. But the main element of love, as practically estimated among men, is such a desire of good to the one loved as involves the _good willing_ or voluntary effort to please and gratify. If a friend simply is pleased with our good qualities, and wishes to please us with his naturally agreeable traits in return, it is of little value in comparison with the truer love which is shown in _voluntary_ efforts to please and make happy. This last is the main element of true affection, and properly is called _voluntary love_ or _good willing_. Theologians express this distinction by the terms the _love of complacency_ and the _love of benevolence_. Thus we have gained these definitions: _Involuntary love_ toward God and toward men consists in agreeable emotions in view of admirable qualities. _Voluntary love_ toward God and toward men consists in _good willing_, or the voluntary effort to please and make happy.