An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
How often may a man observe in himself, that whilst his mind is
intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously
surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of impressions
of sounding bodies made upon the organ of hearing, with the same
alteration that uses to be for the producing the idea of sound? A
sufficient impulse there may be on the organ; but it not reaching the
observation of the mind, there follows no perception: and though the
motion that uses to produce the idea of sound be made in the ear, yet
no sound is heard. Want of sensation, in this case, is not through any
defect in the organ, or that the man’s ears are less affected than at
other times when he does hear but that which uses to produce the idea,
though conveyed in by the usual organ, not being taken notice of in the
understanding, and so imprinting no idea in the mind, there follows no
sensation. So that wherever there is sense of perception, there some
idea is actually produced, and present in the understanding.
5. Children, though they may have Ideas in the Womb, have none innate.
Therefore I doubt not but children, by the exercise of their senses
about objects that affect them in the womb receive some few ideas
before they are born, as the unavoidable effects, either of the bodies
that environ them, or else of those wants or diseases they suffer;
amongst which (if one may conjecture concerning things not very capable
of examination) I think the ideas of hunger and warmth are two: which
probably are some of the first that children have, and which they
scarce ever part with again.
6. The effects of Sensation in the womb.
But though it be reasonable to imagine that children receive some ideas
before they come into the world, yet these simple ideas are far from
those INNATE PRINCIPLES which some contend for, and we, above, have
rejected. These here mentioned, being the effects of sensation, are
only from some affections of the body, which happen to them there, and
so depend on something exterior to the mind; no otherwise differing in
their manner of production from other ideas derived from sense, but
only in the precedency of time. Whereas those innate principles are
supposed to be quite of another nature; not coming into the mind by any
accidental alterations in, or operations on the body; but, as it were,
original characters impressed upon it, in the very first moment of its
being and constitution.
7. Which Ideas appear first is not evident, nor important.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account