An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
without coming one jot nearer the end of such progression.
14. How we cannot have a positive idea of infinity in Quantity.
They who would prove their idea of infinite to be positive, seem to me
to do it by a pleasant argument, taken from the negation of an end;
which being negative, the negation on it is positive. He that considers
that the end is, in body, but the extremity or superficies of that
body, will not perhaps be forward to grant that the end is a bare
negative: and he that perceives the end of his pen is black or white,
will be apt to think that the end is something more than a pure
negation. Nor is it, when applied to duration, the bare negation of
existence, but more properly the last moment of it. But as they will
have the end to be nothing but the bare negation of existence, I am
sure they cannot deny but the beginning of the first instant of being,
and is not by any body conceived to be a bare negation; and therefore,
by their own argument, the idea of eternal, A PARTE ANTE, or of a
duration without a beginning, is but a negative idea.
15. What is positive, what negative, in our Idea of infinite.
The idea of infinite has, I confess, something of positive in all those
things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite space or
duration, we at first step usually make some very large idea, as
perhaps of millions of ages, or miles, which possibly we double and
multiply several times. All that we thus amass together in our thoughts
is positive, and the assemblage of a great number of positive ideas of
space or duration. But what still remains beyond this we have no more a
positive distinct notion of than a mariner has of the depth of the sea;
where, having let down a large portion of his sounding-line, he reaches
no bottom. Whereby he knows the depth to be so many fathoms, and more;
but how much the more is, he hath no distinct notion at all: and could
he always supply new line, and find the plummet always sink, without
ever stopping, he would be something in the posture of the mind
reaching after a complete and positive idea of infinity. In which case,
let this line be ten, or ten thousand fathoms long, it equally
discovers what is beyond it, and gives only this confused and
comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So
much as the mind comprehends of any space, it has a positive idea of:
but in endeavouring to make it infinite,—it being always enlarging,
always advancing,—the idea is still imperfect and incomplete. So much
space as the mind takes a view of in its contemplation of greatness, is
a clear picture, and positive in the understanding: but infinite is
still greater. 1. Then the idea of SO MUCH is positive and clear. 2.
The idea of GREATER is also clear; but it is but a comparative idea,
the idea of SO MUCH GREATER AS CANNOT BE COMPREHENDED. 3. And this is
plainly negative: not positive. For he has no positive clear idea of
the largeness of any extension, (which is that sought for in the idea
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