An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
his mind, and so on as long as he pleases: whereby, if a man had a
positive idea of infinite, either duration or space, he could add two
infinites together; nay, make one infinite infinitely bigger than
another—absurdities too gross to be confuted.
21. Supposed positive Ideas of Infinity, cause of Mistakes.
But yet if after all this, there be men who persuade themselves that
they have clear positive comprehensive ideas of infinity, it is fit
they enjoy their privilege: and I should be very glad (with some others
that I know, who acknowledge they have none such) to be better informed
by their communication. For I have been hitherto apt to think that the
great and inextricable difficulties which perpetually involve all
discourses concerning infinity,—whether of space, duration, or
divisibility, have been the certain marks of a defect in our ideas of
infinity, and the disproportion the nature thereof has to the
comprehension of our narrow capacities. For, whilst men talk and
dispute of infinite space or duration, as if they had as complete and
positive ideas of them as they have of the names they use for them, or
as they have of a yard, or an hour, or any other determinate quantity;
it is no wonder if the incomprehensible nature of the thing they
discourse of, or reason about, leads them into perplexities and
contradictions, and their minds be overlaid by an object too large and
mighty to be surveyed and managed by them.
22. All these are modes of Ideas got from Sensation and Reflection.
If I have dwelt pretty long on the consideration of duration, space,
and number, and what arises from the contemplation of them,—Infinity,
it is possibly no more than the matter requires; there being few simple
ideas whose MODES give more exercise to the thoughts of men than those
do. I pretend not to treat of them in their full latitude. It suffices
to my design to show how the mind receives them, such as they are, from
sensation and reflection; and how even the idea we have of infinity,
how remote soever it may seem to be from any object of sense, or
operation of our mind, has, nevertheless, as all our other ideas, its
original there. Some mathematicians perhaps, of advanced speculations,
may have other ways to introduce into their minds ideas of infinity.
But this hinders not but that they themselves, as well as all other
men, got the first ideas which they had of infinity from sensation and
reflection, in the method we have here set down.
CHAPTER XVIII.
OTHER SIMPLE MODES.
1. Other simple Modes of simple Ideas of sensation.
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