An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
This difference of intention, and remission of the mind in thinking,
with a great variety of degrees between earnest study and very near
minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in
himself. Trace it a little further, and you find the mind in sleep
retired as it were from the senses, and out of the reach of those
motions made on the organs of sense, which at other times produce very
vivid and sensible ideas. I need not, for this, instance in those who
sleep out whole stormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing
the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are sensible
enough to those who are waking. But in this retirement of the mind from
the senses, it often retains a yet more loose and incoherent manner of
thinking, which we call dreaming. And, last of all, sound sleep closes
the scene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think
almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own observation
without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would further
conclude from hence is, that since the mind can sensibly put on, at
several times, several degrees of thinking, and be sometimes, even in a
waking man, so remiss, as to have thoughts dim and obscure to that
degree that they are very little removed from none at all; and at last,
in the dark retirements of sound sleep, loses the sight perfectly of
all ideas whatsoever: since, I say, this is evidently so in matter of
fact and constant experience, I ask whether it be not probable, that
thinking is the action and not the essence of the soul? Since the
operations of agents will easily admit of intention and remission: but
the essences of things are not conceived capable of any such variation.
But this by the by.
CHAPTER XX.
OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.
1. Pleasure and Pain, simple Ideas.
AMONGST the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and
reflection, PAIN and PLEASURE are two very considerable ones. For as in
the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain
or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind is simply so, or
else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call
it how you please. These, like other simple ideas, cannot be described,
nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the simple
ideas of the senses, only by experience. For, to define them by the
presence of good or evil, is no otherwise to make them known to us than
by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and
various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are
differently applied to or considered by us.
2. Good and evil, what.
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