An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2Locke, John
Philosophy
An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding, Volume 1: MDCXC, Based on the 2nd Edition, Books 1 and 2
Locke, John
Knowledge, Theory of -- Early works to 1800
And thus, by a due consideration, and examining any good proposed, it
is in our power to raise our desires in a due proportion to the value
of that good, whereby in its turn and place it may come to work upon
the will, and be pursued. For good, though appearing and allowed ever
so great, yet till it has raised desires in our minds, and thereby made
us uneasy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the
sphere of its activity, our wills being under the determination only of
those uneasinesses which are present to us, which (whilst we have any)
are always soliciting, and ready at hand, to give the will its next
determination. The balancing, when there is any in the mind, being
only, which desire shall be next satisfied, which uneasiness first
removed. Whereby it comes to pass that, as long as any uneasiness, any
desire, remains in our mind, there is no room for good, barely as such,
to come at the will, or at all to determine it. Because, as has been
said, the FIRST step in our endeavours after happiness being to get
wholly out of the confines of misery, and to feel no part of it, the
will can be at leisure for nothing else, till every uneasiness we feel
be perfectly removed: which, in the multitude of wants and desires we
are beset with in this imperfect state, we are not like to be ever
freed from in this world.
48. The Power to suspend the Prosecution of any Desire makes way for
consideration.
There being in us a great many uneasinesses, always soliciting and
ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have said, that the
greatest and most pressing should determine the will to the next
action; and so it does for the most part, but not always. For, the mind
having in most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to SUSPEND
the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires; and so all, one
after another; is at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine
them on all sides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty
man has; and from the not using of it right comes all that variety of
mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our
lives, and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we precipitate the
determination of our wills, and engage too soon, before due
examination. To prevent this, we have a power to suspend the
prosecution of this or that desire; as every one daily may experiment
in himself. This seems to me the source of all liberty; in this seems
to consist that which is (as I think improperly) called FREE-WILL. For,
during this suspension of any desire, before the will be determined to
action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have
opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we
are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we
have done our duty, all that we can, or ought to do, in pursuit of our
happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to
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